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I. INTRODUCTION
History never really repeats itself. Thinking that it does can get you in
trouble. It can make you misinterpret what’s in front of you, seeing parallels
that aren’t there. So, for instance, militant atheists who know about the 
Inquisition, or about the religious defenses of slavery before the Civil 
War, sometimes imagine similar impositions when a Christian asks for a
* © 2019 Andrew Koppelman. John Paul Stevens Professor of Law and Professor 
(by courtesy) of Political Science, Department of Philosophy Affiliated Faculty, Northwestern 
University. Thanks to Steve Smith for comments on earlier drafts.  The treatment of the
contraception mandate repeats points previously made in Frederick Mark Gedicks &
Andrew Koppelman, Invisible Women: Why an Exemption for Hobby Lobby Would Violate 
the Establishment Clause, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 51, 52 (2014), and the discussion
of Michael Paulsen’s work draws on Andrew Koppelman, “Freedom of the Church” and 
the Authority of the State, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 145 (2013). 
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mild religious accommodation: if we allow this, pretty soon they’ll be 
burning heretics again!
Steven Smith’s Pagans and Christians in the City is a marvelous study
of the struggle between ancient Roman paganism and early Christianity.1 
Its great strength is its easy mastery of the local details. He is a terrific 
storyteller.  The book is fun to read.
Smith is not an admirer of Rawls, but the problem to which the book
responds is the one Rawls posed: “How is it possible that there may exist
over time a stable and just society . . . profoundly divided by reasonable 
though incompatible religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?”2  Smith
shows that in Rome it was not possible at all.  The culture wars were
inevitably going to conclude with mass murder.
The Christian case for toleration, Smith observes, could have been offered in
Rawlsian terms, as a vision of overlapping consensus. “The pagan and
Christian worldviews . . . were obviously very different, but they converged
in prescribing allegiance to earthly rulers and obedience to the law adopted 
by those rulers.”3 Tertullian proposed civil peace on just this basis: we 
are not hurting anyone, please leave us alone.4 
But in the end, coexistence between the pagan Romans and the Christians 
was impossible. When they proposed terms, “both sides failed fully to grasp 
and credit the other side’s commitments.”5 The trouble was “that the 
Jerusalem-centered faiths represented a radically different form of religiosity— 
indeed, a fundamentally different orientation to the world—that was 
unassimilable into the Romans’ thoroughly worldly civic piety.”6 Four aspects 
of Christianity made it unendurable to the Romans. The Christians were
unwilling to manifest their loyalty to the emperors by sacrificing to the 
pagan gods—a display that the Romans thought indispensable to civic order.
The Christian teachings “fundamentally contradicted and thus undermined
the basis of civic allegiance and obligation in the Roman political system.”7 
Their teachings endangered the state: “[I]f the gods were insulted or 
 1.  See generally STEVEN D. SMITH, PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS IN THE CITY: CULTURE 
WARS FROM THE TIBER TO THE POTOMAC (2018).
 2.  JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, at xxv (expanded ed. 2005). The words 
I have omitted, “of free and equal citizens,” was not even a possibility in Rome, where 
slavery was routine.  The question was whether the pagans and Christians could achieve 
stability. 
 3.  Id. at 136. 
 4.  See id. at 3–5. 
 5.  Id. at 138. 
 6.  Id. at 102. 
 7.  Id. at 142. 
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offended, they might visit ruin on the community.”8 The condemnation of 
pagan views was insulting.
So, the Roman persecutions of Christians were really inevitable. 
Smith thinks this episode sheds light on today’s culture wars, with 
sobering implications. In contemporary America, there is “a renewal of 
the fourth-century struggle between Christianity and paganism—a struggle 
seeking to reverse the ‘revolution’ that Christianity achieved in late antiquity.”9 
It is a zero-sum game. The Rawlsian aspiration is as forlorn now as it was
then.  And “the scope of conflict and potential repression is much larger than
it was in antiquity.”10 
It is a misdiagnosis. It repeatedly leads Smith astray when he confronts 
contemporary controversies, as he does in the book’s last four chapters.
In the contemporary culture wars, the legal impositions of which conservative
Christians complain do not bear even a family resemblance to what the
Romans imposed. It is not just that Christians do not get crucified. Of the
four features Smith emphasizes, only the dignitary harm is anything like
an analogue, and even there the differences considerably outweigh the
similarities. The most fundamental difference is that the laws that press 
on conservative Christians were not written with them in mind and do not 
require them to abjure their religious faith. Like most religious accommodation 
cases, they involve burdens on religion that were not contemplated by the 
law’s drafters. It thus might be possible to accommodate the religious
objectors without defeating the purposes of the laws. To make that case,
though, Smith would have to engage with those purposes, and he never does
that. 
Smith misunderstands the culture wars, he misunderstands antidiscrimination
law; he misunderstands the recent resistance to state Religious Freedom
Restoration Acts (RFRAs); he misunderstands the contraception mandate;
he misunderstands the basis of religious liberty; and he misunderstands 
the possibilities for achieving the Rawlsian ideal today. 
Torn from their original context, the categories of “pagan” and “Christian”
are too crude to offer any diagnostic help. Similarly with immanence and
transcendence, the fundamental division on which Smith builds his analysis.
Each is open to such a huge variety of specifications that neither has any
 8.  Id. at 145. 
 9.  Id. at 259. 
10. Id. at 360. 
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definite practical or political entailments.  Rome is fascinating, but it does 
not tell us much about contemporary America. 
II. MISUNDERSTANDING THE CULTURE WARS
Smith’s very specific account of ancient history leads him to a more  
dubious grand historical narrative, in which humanity faces a perennial
struggle between three basic orientations toward reality:
One, associated with paganism, is an immanently religious orientation that affirms the
reality of the sacred but locates that sanctity within nature, or within life in this 
world. The other, associated with Christianity, asserts a transcendent sanctity that
while entering into the world, ultimately lies beyond nature. By contrast to these 
orientations, the modern secularism associated with scientific naturalism denies
the existence of the sacred altogether.11 
Today’s culture wars, Smith thinks, are fundamentally based on a collision 
between these world views, and, in particular, the intolerance toward Christians 
of the proponents of paganism and scientism.12 
There has indeed been an unbecoming zeal in the culture wars. But, it 
is no more the necessary consequence of the encounter of these worldviews
than the Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre was the necessary consequence
of the encounter between Catholicism and Protestantism. Religious diversity 
sometimes breeds nasty intolerance. It depends on local contingencies. High
philosophical theory offers limited illumination.13 
Smith associates modern progressive views of sexuality with the rejection 
of theism.  He claims that 
the Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence has systematically dismantled
the Christian norms of sexual morality and marriage that previously were officially 
recognized in  law, and has  moved the law decisively in  the  direction of a view of 
sexuality that resonates with the immanent religiosity of both ancient and modern 
paganism.14 
The Court has thus turned the Constitution “into a partisan instrument in
the struggle between transcendent and immanent conceptions of the city.”15 
Reading Smith, you would not know that American theists are themselves 
divided about these matters. James Davison Hunter, on whom Smith
11. Id. at 223. 
12. See id. at 357–59. 
13. Here I am continuing an argument I have been having with Smith for years.
See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Theorists, Get over Yourselves: A Response to Steven D. 
Smith, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 937 (2014). 
14. SMITH, supra note 1, at 299. 
15. Id. at 300. 
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relies, did not make that mistake. The culture wars, as Hunter understood
them, reflected first and foremost a division within American theistic religion.16 
Hunter’s fundamental contribution was to point out the cleavage between 
orthodox and progressive worldviews. Orthodoxy is characterized by its
adherents’ commitment to an external, definable, and transcendent authority.17 
Progressivism, on the other hand, tends to take human well-being as the 
ultimate standard by which moral judgments and policy decisions are grounded,
and to treat any moral truth as a human construction that is always subject 
to reevaluation in light of experience.18 The defining feature of progressivism
is “the tendency to resymbolize historic faiths according to the prevailing 
assumptions of contemporary life.”19 The old divisions between Protestant,
Catholic, and Jew have been supplanted by new cleavages within these 
groups, in which the orthodox and progressive both ally with likeminded 
members of other denominations against their own coreligionists.20 
The crucial fact that Smith overlooks is that the progressives are theists 
as well. Mostly they are Christians with unusually high levels of education.21 
That is why almost every Christian denomination is divided over the issue
of whether to sanctify same-sex unions. If the progressives were really
pagans, they would not fight. They would just leave their churches. They 
do not. It is, of course, possible to argue that the progressives within each
16. See generally JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE
AMERICA (1991).
17. See id. at 43–45. 
18. See id.
19. Id. at 44–45 (emphasis omitted). 
20. Id. at 47–48. 
21. See David A. Hollinger, Christianity and Its American Fate: Where History Interrogates
Secularization Theory, in THE WORLDS OF AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 280, 281, 
295 (Joel Isaac et al. eds., 2016). Hollinger compiles voluminous social science studies to 
support a refined version of the secularization thesis: 
The more one knows about the world, the less inclined one is to ascribe to
supernatural authority whatever value one finds in the teachings and social function 
of Protestant and Catholic churches, and the less inclined one is to invoke supernatural 
authority as a warrant for whatever specific worldly conduct one advocates.
Id. at 289 (emphasis omitted). The theological implications are not obvious. Hollinger 
observes that 
the secularization debates would look different if they were informed by the 
conviction that liberalized Protestantism and Catholicism were the real Christianity, 
and the so-called orthodoxy of the conservatives was simply a set of anachronisms left 
over from times and places in which Christianity took on the contours of cultures then 
enjoying hegemony. 
Id. at 295. 
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of these denominations are in theological error, that every last one of their 
theologies, rightly understood, support the orthodox. But to show that, 
one would need to get deep into each tradition—and even then, one would 
end up revealing, not paganism, but theistic heresy. Smith does not attempt 
that.22 
Smith thinks that the conflicting orientations described by Hunter “reflected, 
and reflect, the competing transcendent and immanent religiosities we
have been discussing in this book.”23 Actually, the transcendent-immanent
distinction cuts across the orthodox-progressive one. The goods of this 
world have varying degrees of importance within the varying forms of
transcendent religiosity. Smith thinks that “what may seem like abstract
differences in the location of the sacred support fundamentally different
orientations or attitudes toward the world—different orientations with 
effects and profound implications for even the most mundane aspects of
life.”24  There may be a relation, but it is not one of logical implication.
Smith understands that the transcendent orientation is not necessarily 
dead to immanent goods. It “can acknowledge the beauty and sublimity of
life in the world.”25 What distinguishes it is that it deems these to be “reflective 
of a more transcendent Reality.”26 So those who embrace transcendence 
will still often make moral judgments based on what is good for human
beings in the world. 
There are, of course, some enthusiasts for transcendence who are indifferent 
to human well-being and human pain. They are the ones who give religion
a bad reputation. Once one decides that pain matters, religious progressivism 
has obvious attractions. Martin Luther thought celibacy was too much to
ask even of dedicated clergy like himself who had deliberately chosen it.27 
Conservative theism today demands it of every gay person. The response 
of liberal Christians, that God cannot be this pitiless, has nothing to do with 
paganism, and in fact is incompatible with it. 
22. At one point, listing those who are “believers in transcendent religion,” he 
includes “orthodox Christians,” thus implying that less orthodox Christians are pagans.  
SMITH, supra note 1, at 248.  When he goes back in time, he is more willing to acknowledge 
that a variety of political positions are consistent with theism.  The Civil War “was fought 
out, explained, and rationalized, on both sides, largely under the encompassing canopy of 
the biblical civil religion.”  Id. at 263.  Abolitionists can be understood as early proponents 
of progressivism, rejecting the force of familiar Biblical defenses of slavery on the basis 
of a focus on what slaves’ lives were actually like. 
23. Id. at 266. 
24. Id. at 114. 
25. Id. at 189. 
26. Id. at 190. 
27. See Trevor O. Reggio, Martin Luther on Marriage and Family, 2 HIST. RES. 195,
196, 204 (2012). 
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Modern secularists, Smith claims, hold “views of sexual morality that
in important respects parallel those of pagan Rome.”28 He quotes with
approval Ferdinand Mount: “[W]e are reluctant to condemn any specific
sexual practice as wrong in itself. Between consenting adults in private, 
there are almost no limits.”29 
How significant is that little detail about consent? 
Smith cites Geoffrey Stone’s Sex and the Constitution for the parallel
between modern sexual liberation and the views of the Romans.30  Stone
does draw such a parallel, but, unlike Smith, he sentimentalizes Roman
sexual ethics, declaring nostalgically that for “the pre-Christian world” (a 
term Stone uses to refer to the elites of Greece, Rome, and the Jews), sex
was regarded “as a natural and positive part of human experience.”31  That
sounds nice. It is too nice. It is true that the Romans felt no guilt about sex,
but they felt no guilt about a lot of things.  If you were a rich Roman, one
of the pleasures of life was the convenience of having slaves to rape.32 
One of the most important achievements of the sexual revolution is its 
insistence on authentic consent to sex and a sometimes painful sensitivity
to the varieties of sexual coercion.  The Romans would have regarded all 
of that with pitiless indifference.
Modern liberal reform efforts have, for centuries, been animated largely
by a revulsion against cruelty.33 That is what produces the liberal positions
on abortion, contraception, and gay rights.  Smith claims that modern paganism 
28. SMITH, supra note 1, at 282. 
29. Id. at 288 (quoting FERDINAND MOUNT, FULL CIRCLE: HOW THE CLASSICAL WORLD 
CAME BACK TO US 104 (2010)).
30. See id. at 282. 
31. GEOFFREY R. STONE, SEX AND THE CONSTITUTION: SEX, RELIGION, AND LAW
FROM AMERICA’S ORIGINS TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 4 (2017). For my review of
Stone, see Andrew Koppelman, Sex and the Civitas, NEW RAMBLER (July 3, 2017), https:// 
newramblerreview.com/book-reviews/law/sex-and-the-civitas [https://perma.cc/4E67- 86DY].
32. Smith explains what Roman sexual liberation amounted to: 
the vast slave populations, the ubiquitous brothels staffed by desperate and 
downtrodden women, the lethal savagery of the gladiatorial games, the widespread 
practice of infanticide, and the dismal tenement housing afflicted by fire and 
filth and disease.  In our own times, by contrast, the pagan city would be one 
that has renounced slavery, has declared an equality of men and women, and has 
condemned (though not actually eliminated, alas) not only physical violence but 
also harassment, bullying, and microaggressions. 
SMITH, supra note 1, at 345; see also id. at 76–78 (detailing the predatory character of
Roman sexuality). But he does not notice how this ruins his other parallels. 
33. See JUDITH N. SHKLAR, ORDINARY VICES 7–44 (1984). 
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“does not seem to demand much of its adherents, either creedally or 
behaviorally.”34  Then how does he explain this reforming zeal?
Smith thinks that the shift in constitutional law toward the protection of
these sexual freedoms “played a central role both in expressing and in
facilitating this shift from a Christian to a more pagan sexual ethics.”35  It 
is all about theological symbolism:
the embrace of the morality of the sexual revolution by modern laws is cherished, or 
resented, not only (and perhaps not even primarily) for the laws’ practical consequences,
but rather for their impact in symbolizing the rejection of the older Christian conception
of the community in favor of a revised conception—a conception, I have suggested, 
that might aptly be described as “pagan.”36 
The women who died in illegal abortions, or who had unwanted pregnancies 
because contraception was unavailable, and the gay men who were closeted, 
terrorized into celibacy, or hunted down by the police would have been
surprised to learn that the law’s “direct, formally legal impact on sexual 
behavior was often de minimis.”37 The reformers were impatient with
conservative Christianity, but this was primarily because of its easy tolerance
for suffering, especially other people’s. The movement for legal reform 
did not embrace paganism or aim to insult Christians. When I take a pebble
out of my shoe, I mean no disrespect to the pebble.  This isn’t about you.
III. MISUNDERSTANDING ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW
Smith is particularly troubled by the unwillingness to grant religious 
exemptions from antidiscrimination laws, even when there are plenty of
nondiscriminatory service providers available. When conservative Christians 
are sued for discrimination, “people are using the law to crack down on a 
religion or a way of life that they disapprove of but that doesn’t seem to
be realistically harming them or interfering with their own lives in any
obvious way.  Why would they do that?”38 
The obvious way to investigate this question is using the standard techniques 
of anthropology: you get to know the natives and try to learn their own
stories about why they are doing what they are doing. Smith does not appear 
to have attempted that.39 
34. SMITH, supra note 1, at 367. 
35. Id. at 289. 
36. Id. at 291. 
37. Id. On the burdens of the prohibition of contraception that the Supreme Court 
invalidated in Griswold v. Connecticut, see DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY:
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE 94–95 (1994).
38. SMITH, supra note 1, at 7.
39. At one point, he acknowledges that “both sides are struggling to avoid being 
dominated, culturally and politically.” Id. at 265 n.32.  But that point is not pursued. 
400
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The “most important factor” by which “the space for the free practice 
of transcendent religion becomes ever more cramped,” he tells us, is “the
enactment and expansion of ambitious antidiscrimination laws.”40  When
conservative Christians object to facilitating or recognizing same-sex
marriages, they “are told: accept requirements that put you in violation of
your religion or else get out of your business or profession.”41 Why are they
being treated this way?  Smith has elsewhere explained that the discrimination 
suits against them are “another instance in the centuries-old pattern in which 
governments have attempted to compel dissenters or outliers to publicly
affirm and acquiesce to the dominant orthodoxy.”42 
The antidiscrimination laws however are not there in order to pick on 
Christians. They are there because there is a lot of nasty discrimination.
Here is a summary of more than a thousand reports to gay rights organization 
helplines: 
Ranging from humiliating harassment to outright service denials, the reports describe
discrimination by pharmacies, hospitals, dental offices, and other medical settings;
professional accounting services, automobile dealerships and repair shops, gas
stations, convenience stores, restaurants, bars, hotels and other lodging; barber
shops and beauty salons; stores such as big box retailers, discount stores, pet stores, 
clothing stores, and toy stores; swimming pools and gyms; libraries and homeless 
shelters; and transportation services including busses, taxis, ride-shares, trains,
air travel, and cruise ships. Discrimination reports included contexts with limited 
alternate options, such as by tow truck drivers, post office employees, and repair
service technicians working in the homes of LGBT customers.43 
There are stories of patients harassed in hospitals, parents turned away
when bringing injured children for medical care, taxis ejecting passengers 
on the side of highways at night, couples thrown out of restaurants for minor 
displays of affection, a steady drumbeat of discrimination and abuse.  
Discrimination is common enough that there is a genre of “gay-friendly”
40. Id. at 340. 
41. Id. at 343. 
42. Steven Smith, What Masterpiece Cakeshop Is Really About, PUB. DISCOURSE 
(Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2017/10/20148/ [https://perma.cc/ 
C8NM-SDYN].
43. Brief of Amici Curiae Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc. et al. in 
Support of Respondents at 9, Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138
S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111). 
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guides to goods and services,44 much like The Negro Motorist Green Book,45 
which, before the Civil Rights Act of 1964, identified establishments that 
would serve black customers. 
The expectation of possible discrimination is itself exhausting.  The  
experience of “discrimination results in a state of heightened vigilance 
and changes in behavior, which in itself can trigger stress responses—that 
is, even the anticipation of discrimination is sufficient to cause people to 
become stressed.”46 Apprehension about probable future threats can produce
an increase in physical pain, and, in fact, perceived discrimination is correlated
with chronic pain. The mechanisms are understood. Anxiety is “negative
affect based on apprehension about anticipated future threats that have
uncertain outcomes.”47 This produces “hypervigilance [that] can result in
neuro-biological changes that can result in hyperalgesia (increased sensitivity 
to pain).”48 This may be evolutionarily adaptive because “heightened pain 
sensitivity allows potential threats to be detected more readily.”49 
This is why it will not do to simply say that there are plenty of other 
bakers and photographers. The harm is not ameliorated because the injury
does not invariably occur.  The uncertainty is itself a harm.
44. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Scholars of Behavioral Science & Economics
in Support of Respondents at 11, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111).  
45. VICTOR H. GREEN, THE NEGRO MOTORIST GREEN-BOOK (William H. Green Ed.,
1940).
46. AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, STRESS IN AMERICA: THE IMPACT OF DISCRIMINATION
8 (2016) (citing Pamela J. Sawyer et al., Discrimination and the Stress Response: 
Psychological and Physiological Consequences of Anticipating Prejudice in Interethnic 
Interactions, 102 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1020, 1020–26 (2012)). 
47. Timothy T. Brown et al., Discrimination Hurts: The Effect of Discrimination
on the Development of Chronic Pain, SOC. SCI. & MED., May 2018, at 1, 2 (citing
Weredeselam M. Olango & David P. Finn, 20 NEUROBIOLOGY OF STRESS-INDUCED
HYPERALGESIA, in Behavioral Neurobiology of Chronic Pain 251 (Bradley K. Taylor & David 
P. Finn eds., 2014). 
48. Id. 
49. Id.  Other evidence of the individualized harm of discrimination is compiled in 
Brief of Amici Curiae Ilan H. Meyer et al. in Support of Respondents, Masterpiece Cakeshop
v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111). 
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That is why antidiscrimination law is necessary.50  That is why twenty-
one states and the District of Columbia have statutes prohibiting discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation.51 
Gay people still remember a huge range of other indignities, including 
being hunted down by police, driven out of their jobs, involuntarily committed
to mental institutions, and lobotomized.52 These activities reached their 
peak in the 1950s,53 a period that some recall with nostalgic longing. When
one counts America’s misdeeds, the 1950s antigay panic should take its 
rightful place beside the genocide of Native Americans, slavery, Jim Crow, 
and the internment of Japanese-Americans. These abuses were usually
justified by citing morality and religion.54 
When gay people look at conservative Christian attitudes toward sexuality 
and see nothing but hatred, it is on the basis of this kind of experience.  They
misunderstand conservative Christianity.  I have been saying so to my
colleagues in the gay rights community for years.55  I have gotten my share
50. For a comprehensive review of the evidence, see generally Jennifer C. Pizer et
al., Evidence of Persistent and Pervasive Workplace Discrimination Against LGBT
People: The Need for Federal Legislation Prohibition Discrimination and Providing for 
Equal Employment Benefits, 45 LOY.L.A.L.REV. 715 (2012). For evidence that discrimination 
in public accommodations is as common with sexual orientation as it is with race and sex, 
see generally Christy Mallory & Brad Sears, Refusing to Serve LGBT People: An Empirical 
Assessment of Complaints Filed Under State Public Accommodations Non-Discrimination 
Laws, 8 J. RES. IN GENDER STUD. 106 (2018). See also the scholarship cited in the report 
accompanying the Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. REP. NO. 113-105, at 
14–19 (2013).
51. See Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Nonsense About Bathrooms: How Purported
Concerns over Safety Block LGBT Nondiscrimination Laws and Obscure Real Religious 
Liberty Concerns, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1373, 1379–83 (2017). 
52. See Andrew Koppelman, Why Gay Legal History Matters, 113 HARV. L. REV. 
2035, 2038–39 (2000) (reviewing WILLIAM M. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING
THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET (1999)). 
53. Id.
54. See id. at 2040–41, 2053. 
55. See Andrew Koppelman, A Free Speech Response to the Gay Rights/Religious 
Liberty Conflict, 110 NW. U.L. REV. 1125, 1128 (2016); Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights,
Religious Accommodations, and the Purposes of Antidiscrimination Law, 88 S. CAL. L.
REV. 619, 620 (2015); Andrew Koppelman, You Can’t Hurry Love: Why Antidiscrimination 
Protections for Gay People Should Have Religious Exemptions, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 125, 
126 (2006). 
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of abuse for it.56 But I understand what has brought so many proponents of 
gay rights to this misunderstanding.
The logic is depressingly familiar: some members of group X hurt me,
therefore every member of X is malevolent and dangerous. This happens 
a lot. Many Americans are profoundly ignorant of Islam. After the September
11, 2001 attacks, they were ripe for appeals to bigotry, culminating in the
incomparable Donald Trump’s declaration that “Islam hates us.”57  This
kind of distorting vision, of course, makes coexistence difficult. 
Smith has fallen into a parallel error. Some gay rights activists do want 
to humiliate conservative Christians. Therefore, humiliating conservative 
Christians is what gay rights is all about.
Gay rights activists, for the most part, are happy to leave conservatives 
alone.58 They however worry, on the basis of ample experience, that the 
conservatives cannot be trusted to leave them alone. They resist religious
accommodation because they think that the law is holding back a tidal wave 
of hatred masked by religious rationalization. They fear that so many people 
will take advantage of any exemption that the law’s protection will be nullified. 
It is not an unreasonable fear. I disagree, but the question is reasonably
contestable. 
IV. MISUNDERSTANDING THE STRUGGLE OVER RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
There is, in fact, a powerful animus on the left against the very idea of
“religious liberty,” instantiated in the fight over the Indiana RFRA.  But
Smith omits from his narrative the crucial fact that the Indiana statute was
enacted precisely in an effort to make sure that what happened in Elane 
Photography, LLC v. Willock in New Mexico, where a religious wedding 
photographer was denied exemption from an antidiscrimination law,59 
56. For a particularly vehement example, see generally Shannon Gilreath & Ashley 
Ward, Same-Sex Marriage, Religious Accommodation, and the Race Analogy, 41 VT. L.
REV. 237 (2016). 
57. Theodore Schleifer, Donald Trump: ‘I Think Islam Hates Us,’ CNN (Mar.
10, 2016, 5:56 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2016/03/09/politics/donald-trump-islam-hates-
us/ [https://perma.cc/KX9H-6XC8].
58. The motives of those who file lawsuits in response to the insult of being turned 
away are sometimes less admirable. See Smith, supra note 42. But the questionable motives
of a plaintiff are not relevant to adjudication. If you negligently drive your car into my
house and I sue you, the court will not care that I have hated you since kindergarten for reasons
of racism or sheer malignity. Even if the plaintiffs in some of these cases are trying to compel
affirmation of what the Christian merchants do not want to believe, this has nothing to do
with their legal claim.
59. See generally 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013). 
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would not happen in Indiana. It aimed to license such exemptions, and 
everyone knew that.60 
The federal RFRA was enacted to reinstate a rule, laid down and later 
abandoned by the Supreme Court, that those with religious objectors to 
laws must be accommodated unless applying the law to them is necessary
to some compelling state interest. After the Supreme Court held that Congress 
had exceeded its constitutional powers by making that law applicable to 
the states,61 many state legislatures responded by passing their own state-
level RFRAs, which, like the federal law, make religious accommodations 
available unless the state can show a compelling justification for denying 
them.62 Barack Obama, as a state senator, voted for one of the earliest ones
in Illinois in 1998.63  There are now twenty-one state RFRAs.64  Most of
these came soon after City of Boerne v. Flores was decided in 1997,65 but 
the movement for them had waned—only three were enacted between 2003
and 2013—until the Elane Photography case created new interest among
religious conservatives.66 
It never occurred to gay rights advocates to oppose the first wave of
RFRAs.67 The meaning changed in a new context. And, once more, a lot
of the law’s opponents were Christians. They honestly feared the Indiana 
60. Smith is correct that the law was so vaguely worded that it might not have delivered
the exemptions. See SMITH, supra note 1, at 317. Gay rights advocates often described the law
in a misleading way. But religious conservatives did the same thing in order to sell the 
legislation to their constituents. The claims on both sides depended on unsupported speculation
about what the courts would do with the law’s language. 
61. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). 
62. See, e.g., State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, NAT’L CONF.ST.LEGISLATURES
(May 4, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/4692-9G4K].
63. Katie Sanders, Did Barack Obama Vote for Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
with ‘Very Same’ Wording as Indiana’s?, POLITIFACT (Mar. 29, 2015, 6:57 PM),
https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2015/mar/29/mike-pence/did-barack-
obama-vote-religious-freedom-restoratio/ [https://perma.cc/E383-DFXZ].
64. State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, supra note 62. 
65. See generally 521 U.S. 507. 
66. See David Johnson & Katy Steinmetz, This Map Shows Every State with Religious-
Freedom Laws, TIME (Apr. 2, 2015), https://time.com/3766173/religious-freedom-laws-
map-timeline/ [https://perma.cc/FHE9-TYA9].
67. And even now, Smith observes, they are untroubled by a lot of accommodations,
such as permission for Muslim prisoners to wear short beards.  SMITH, supra note 1, at 318. 
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RFRA would be used to defeat any antidiscrimination protection for gay
people.68 
When Smith takes up the contraception mandate, he again misses the 
point. He thinks contraception was mandated by the Obama Administration 
as part of preventive health services “less because of the practical consequences
of the law than because of what it symbolizes.”69 He claims that “most women 
today could likely obtain contraceptives without legal requirements mandating 
that employers supply them—by private purchase or from subsidized entities
like Planned Parenthood.”70 Therefore, “the conspicuous insistence that
contraception be provided by employers, rather than through a range of 
other methods that are sometimes proposed, can be seen as an effort to elicit
or extract those employers’ support for that policy with its underlying
morality.”71 
It can be seen that way, unless you really look. The story of the contraceptive 
mandate is a lot more complicated. 
In the United States, most health insurance for the non-elderly is provided 
through employers.72  Employer-based coverage has the economic advantages 
of economies of scale and the creation of natural risk pools.73 It is also 
encouraged by the tax code.74 Most Americans depend upon it. The failure 
of Bill Clinton’s health care reform bill showed that any health care reform 
that transforms most people’s coverage will run into insuperable political
68. It is thus anthropologically inaccurate to say, as Smith does, that the campaign
against the law 
was about affirming righteousness and stamping out wickedness, and the Indiana law 
provided a convenient symbol or focal point; the law was more important for 
what it symbolized—or for what, construed with an advocate’s ample license, it 
could be made to symbolize—than for its actual legal and practical effects. 
Id. at 317. Doubtless this is true of some opponents of the law, but here Smith has fallen
prey to the fallacy of composition.
69. Id. at 292. 
70. Id. (citing Helen Alvaré, Meanwhile, Outside the Panic Room: Contraception,
Hobby Lobby, and Women’s Rights, PUB. DISCOURSE (July 10, 2014), https://www.the
publicdiscourse.com/2014/07/13467/).
71. Id. at 293. 
72. See TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, HEALTH CARE AT RISK: A CRITIQUE OF THE
CONSUMER-DRIVEN MOVEMENT 10 (2007).
73. See id. at 64.
74. Id. at 55–64. 
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obstacles.75 So Obama worked within the system as he found it.76  The
requirements imposed on employers are a corollary of that basic decision. 
The Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA)77 seeks to approach the goal 
of universal coverage by, among other innovations, expanding employer health
insurance, with a requirement that large employers provide their employees
with such insurance or pay a penalty.78 The requirement would, of course, 
accomplish little if the government said nothing about what must be covered
by the insurance.  So a minimum benefits package is specified.
Among other things, the ACA mandates that insurers cover “preventive 
health services” without additional charge—that is, without co-payments, 
co-insurance, deductibles, or the like.79 Congress did this in response to studies 
showing that “[i]ndividuals are more likely to use preventive services if
they do not have to satisfy cost-sharing requirements” and that “[u]se
of preventive services results in a healthier population and reduces health
care costs by helping individuals avoid preventable conditions and receive
treatment earlier.”80 
The implementing regulations recognized that “women have unique health 
care needs [that] include contraceptive services” and sought to “ensure that
recommended preventive services for women would be covered adequately.”81 
One of the principal inequities of the health care system before the ACA
was that insurance often excluded coverage of medical needs specific to
women, making women bear higher health care costs than men—as much 
75. See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE TOUGH LUCK CONSTITUTION AND THE ASSAULT
ON HEALTH CARE REFORM 25–28 (2013). The recent enthusiasm of Democrats for abandoning
Obamacare in favor of a single-payer scheme suggests many of them have not learned this 
lesson. See Paul Starr, The Pleasant Illusions of the Medicare-for-All Debate, AM. PROSPECT
(Feb. 7, 2019), https://prospect.org/article/pleasant-illusions-medicare-all-debate [https://perma.cc/
J9EK-FD3N].
76. See id. at 25–31. 
77. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010) (predominantly codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
78. See generally KOPPELMAN, supra note 75. 
79.  42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13 (2012). 
80. Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 
Fed. Reg. 39,870, 39,872 (July 2, 2013) (citing INST. OF  MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS.,
CLINICAL PREVENTATIVE SERVICES FOR WOMEN: CLOSING THE GAPS 16 (2011)).
81. Id. (citing INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 80, at 9); see also
INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 80, at 18–20 (noting women’s health needs
differ from those of men, and that these differences have a serious impact on the cost of
healthcare coverage).
407
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as a billion dollars a year more in the aggregate.82 Women of childbearing 
age spend 68% more in out-of-pocket health care costs than men, largely
because of the costs of reproductive and gender-specific conditions, including 
the costs of contraception.83 Some contraceptive methods are not medically
suitable for women with particular medical conditions or risk factors, and 
certain more expensive methods are more effective at preventing pregnancy 
than less costly alternatives.84 
Women take account of costs when deciding whether to use contraceptives.85 
Without insurance coverage, the affected women will incur significant 
out-of-pocket costs or forgo contraceptives altogether.86  For women who
need a particular contraception option at a particular time, this loss of coverage
is a discrete, focused, and significant harm, especially in emergencies entailing 
the risk of pregnancy from coerced sex.
In addition, there are numerous health-related and economic repercussions 
associated with the failure to make available the full range of contraception. 
For example, pregnancy may be dangerous for women with serious medical 
82. See generally DANIELLE GARRETT ET AL., NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., TURNING TO
FAIRNESS: INSURANCE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN TODAY AND THE AFFORDABLE CARE 
ACT (2012), https://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/nwlc_2012_turningtofairness_ 
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6M7-LVNF]; Denise Grady, Overhaul Will Lower the Costs 
of Being a Woman, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/30/ 
health/30women.html [https://perma.cc/7U9M-8XPL]. 
83. INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 80, at 19–20; see also Rachel Benson
Gold, The Need for and Cost of Mandating Private Insurance Coverage of Contraception, 
GUTTMACHER REP. ON PUB. POL’Y, Aug. 1998, at 5, 5; James Trussell et al., Erratum to
“Cost Effectiveness of Contraceptives in the United States,” 80 CONTRACEPTION 229, 229 
(2009).
84. See Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act,
78 Fed. Reg. at 39,872; INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 80, at 105. When
I investigated in 2014, the cost of an IUD, the most reliable and cost-effective form of 
contraception, was very high. See Gedicks & Koppelman, supra note *, at 58 nn.28–29.
The providers now no longer reveal the prices on their websites. See How Much Does Paragard 
Cost?, PARAGARD, https://www.paragard.com/faq/how-much-does-paragard-cost/ [https://
perma.cc/DK6Z-XX2Y]; If Mirena Isn’t Covered, MIRENA, https://www.mirena-us.com/
if-mirena-isnt-covered/ [https://perma.cc/5A6L-6X9C]; see also Jeanne Pinder, How Much
Does an IUD Cost? $55 to $2,600, CLEAR HEALTH COSTS (Jan. 13, 2014), https://
clearhealthcosts.com/blog/2014/01/much-iud-birth-control-cost-draft/ [https://perma.cc/ 
9CGN-S3PH] (explaining that, on average, in 2014 Paragard cost $680 and Mirena cost
$307–$1100).
85. See Melissa S. Kearney & Phillip B. Levine, Subsidized Contraception, Fertility,
and Sexual Behavior, 91 REV. ECON. & STAT. 137, 137 (2009) (decreasing the cost of 
contraceptives leads to a higher usage rate which, in turn, decreases the rate of unintended 
pregnancies).
86. A 2007 study found that 52% of women—compared with only 39% of men—failed
to fill a prescription, missed a recommended test or treatment, or did not schedule a necessary
specialist appointment because of cost. Sheila D. Rustgi et al., Women at Risk: Why Many 
Women Are Forgoing Needed Health Care, COMMONWEALTH FUND, May 2009, at 1, 3. 
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conditions, such as pulmonary hypertension, cyanotic heart disease, and 
Marfan Syndrome.87 The lives of women suffering from these conditions
literally depends on their access to the contraception most effective for them.
Similarly, “there are demonstrated preventive health benefits from contraceptives
relating to conditions other than pregnancy,” which include the prevention 
of certain cancers, menstrual disorders, and acne.88 Again, proper treatment 
of women suffering from these conditions depends upon their access to 
particular forms of contraception.
The use of contraceptives also reduces the risk of unintended pregnancies, 
which comprise nearly half of all pregnancies in the United States.89  Women
with unintended pregnancies are less likely to receive timely prenatal care
and are more likely to smoke, consume alcohol, become depressed,90 experience
domestic violence during pregnancy, and terminate their pregnancies by 
abortion.91 Finally, unintended pregnancies prevent women from participating 
in labor and employment markets on an equal basis with men.92 
87. INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 80, at 103–04; see also Coverage
of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. at 39,872
(explaining contraception also helps reduce the risk of adverse pregnancy outcomes). 
88. Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 
Fed. Reg. at 39,872 (citing INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 80, at 107). 
89. INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 80, at 102 (citing Lawrence B.
Finer & Stanley K. Henshaw, Disparities in Rates of Unintended Pregnancy in the United
States, 1994 and 2001, 38 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 90, 90, 92 (2006)). 
90. Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of
Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg.
8725, 8727 (Feb. 15, 2012) (“[W]omen experiencing an unintended pregnancy may not 
immediately be aware that they are pregnant, and thus delay prenatal care. They also may 
not be as motivated to discontinue behaviors that pose pregnancy-related risks (e.g., smoking,
consumption of alcohol). Studies show a greater risk of preterm birth and low birth weight 
among unintended pregnancies compared with pregnancies that were planned.” (citing
INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 80, at 103)).
91. INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 80, at 102–03 (citing COMM.
ON UNINTENDED PREGNANCY DIV. OF HEALTH PROMOTION & DISEASE PREVENTION, INST.
OF MED., THE BEST INTENTIONS: UNINTENDED PREGNANCY AND THE WELL-BEING OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 75 (Sarah S. Brown & Leon Eisenberg eds., 1995)); see also Coverage
of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. at 39,872. 
92. See Jennifer J. Frost & Laura Duberstein Lindberg, Reasons for Using Contraception: 
Perspectives of US Women Seeking Care at Specialized Family Planning Clinics, 87
CONTRACEPTION 465, 465 (2013) (“Economic analyses have found clear associations between
the availability and diffusion of oral contraceptives, particularly among young women, and
increases in US women’s education, labor force participation, and average earnings, coupled
with a narrowing in the wage gap between women and men.”).
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Accordingly, the Department of Health and Human Services issued the
“contraception mandate,” a rule that defines all FDA-approved contraceptives
as preventive service.93  The mandate improves the health of pregnant women
and newborns, reduces the disparity in health costs between men and women,
and, most importantly, allows women to determine the course of their own
lives.94 
The rule elicited objections from churches and other nonprofit religious 
entities that conscientiously objected to facilitating what they regard as evil 
conduct.95 The Obama administration devised accommodations for objecting
religious organizations but refused accommodations to for-profit businesses
whose owners religiously object to some or all of the mandated contraception
coverage.96 Those businesses employed enormous numbers of women 
who did not share the employers’ religious beliefs; Hobby Lobby alone
has more than 13,000 full time employees.97  The Hobby Lobby litigation
followed.98 The store won its exemption, but not the relief it was asking
for, which was to absolutely cut off its employees from coverage for the
expensive forms of contraception that the employer found objectionable.99 
V. MISUNDERSTANDING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY ITSELF
So, what should the law of religious liberty look like? 
Smith is troubled by courts’ willingness to balance religion against other
goods.100 That itself seems to smack of paganism, treating religious scruples 
as just another intense human desire to be weighed against other less exalted 
desires.
He relies on “Madison’s careful demonstration that every person’s first
obligation (over which the state and civil society have no ‘cognizance’) is
to God—an obligation, Madison stressed, that must be measured by the person’s 
93. Caroline Mala Corbin, The Contraception Mandate, 107 NW. U.L. REV. COLLOQUY
151, 151 (2012); Affordable Care Act Ensures Women Receive Preventive Services at No 
Additional Cost, HHS (Aug. 1, 2011), http://wayback.archive-it.org/3926/20140108162111/
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2011pres/08/20110801b.html [https://perma.cc/D8N5-RHGQ].
94. See Corbin, supra note 93, at 160–61. 
95. See Hannah Anderson, Contentious Contraception: The Controversial History 
of the ACA’s Birth Control Mandate, ST.LOUIS U. (Nov. 1,2017),https://www.slu.edu/law/law-
journal/online/2017-18/contentious-contraception.php [https://perma.cc/D79L-UE3B]. 
96. See Robert Pear, Birth Control Rule Altered to Allay Religious Objections, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 1, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/02/us/politics/white-house-proposes- 
compromise-on-contraception-coverage.html [https://perma.cc/M252-HTS7].
97. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1284 (W.D. Okla. 
2012), rev’d, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, No. CIV-12-1000-HE, 2013 
WL 5297798 (D.D.C. July 19, 2013). 
98. See generally Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
99. Brief for Respondents at 3–5, Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (No. 13-354). 
100. See SMITH, supra note 1, at 306, 323. 
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own judgment.”101 Madison thought “that our duties to ‘the Creator’ are
prior to our duties to society.”102 Smith cites with approval Michael Paulsen’s
argument that religious accommodation “is based on an acknowledgment
of a transcendent reality, or at least of the possibility of such a reality.”103 
Accommodation is an imperative: “[A] government that defies what a 
transcendent authority is thought to command would be in a different and 
more unsatisfactory position than a government that merely declines to
recognize some other sort of potentially meritorious objection.”104 
The argument Smith makes here builds on the assertions in James Madison’s
Memorial and Remonstrance that “[i]t is the duty of every man to render to
the Creator such homage, and such only, as he believes to be acceptable to 
him,” and that “every man who becomes a member of any particular Civil
Society [must] do it with a saving of his allegiance to the Universal
Sovereign.”105 Michael McConnell has made these assertions a premise
for an argument—never stated by Madison—that religion ought to be a basis
for exemptions because it involves a duty to God.106 
If the scope of religious liberty is defined by religious duty (man must render to 
God “such homage as he believes to be acceptable to him”), and if the claims of
civil society are subordinate to the claims of religious freedom, it would seem to
follow that the dictates of religious faith must take precedence over the laws of
the state, even if they are secular and generally applicable.107 
101. Id. at 326 (citing James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments [Virginia], 1785, in CHURCH AND STATE IN THE MODERN AGE: A DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY 59, 60 (J.F. Maclear ed., 1995)). 
102. Id. at 312–13 (citing Madison, supra note 101, at 59). 
103. Id. at 314–15 (citing Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Priority of God: A Theory of
Religious Liberty, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1159, 1160–61 (2013)). 
104. Id. at 322. 
105. 2 JAMES MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183, 184–85 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901). 
106. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of
Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV.L.REV. 1409, 1453, 1497 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell, 
Origins and Historical Understanding]; Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling
Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 29 (2000) [hereinafter McConnell, Problem of Singling
Out Religion]; Michael W. McConnell, Why Is Religious Liberty the “First Freedom”?, 
21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1243, 1246–47 (2000). 
107. McConnell, Origins and Historical Understanding, supra note 106, at 1453. 
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McConnell claims that religion has a unique claim to accommodation because
“[n]o other freedom is a duty to a higher authority.”108 Even those who do
not believe in God should understand the value of avoiding “conflicts with 
what are perceived (even if incorrectly) as divine commands.”109 
Smith makes a similar argument. In the classical conception he aims to 
revive, “[t]he church and its officials were something like the ambassadors of
the kingdom of God within the secular domain . . . and they thus enjoyed a 
sort of diplomatic immunity from secular law.”110 Like McConnell, Smith
relies on the first paragraph of Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance to
show that this conception is reflected, albeit imperfectly, in the American
law of religious liberty.111 
Paulsen has shown where this logic leads, though he does not regard it
as a reductio ad absurdum. The canonical formulation is that accommodation
can be denied only if this is necessary to a compelling state interest.112 
Paulsen correctly observes that the compelling interest “formulation subtly
implies ultimate state supremacy, rather than the priority of God.”113 Paulsen
thinks, as does Smith, that religious freedom presupposes that God’s demands
precede, and are superior in obligation to, those of the state.  “As a matter
of the constitutional text, the problem remains that there is no compelling-
interest override written into the Free Exercise Clause; it is all judicial
interpolation. How can such an exception be justified as proper constitutional
interpretation?”114 
It would seem, then, that the state must yield to religion in every context. 
“God’s commands—God’s will, God’s purposes—rightfully trump man’s.
Freedom of religion, understood as a human legal right, is government’s
recognition of the priority and superiority of God’s true commands over 
anything the State requires or forbids.”115 
108. McConnell, Problem of Singling Out Religion, supra note 106, at 30; see also
Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1109, 1152 (1990). 
109. McConnell, Problem of Singling Out Religion, supra note 106, at 30. 
110. Steven D. Smith, Freedom of Religion or Freedom of the Church?, in LEGAL
RESPONSES TO RELIGIOUS PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES 249, 268 (Austin Sarat ed., 2012). 
111. See id. at 273–74. 
112. 
113. 
See Paulsen, supra note 103, at 1210. 
Id.
114. Id. at 1207. 
115. Id. at 1160. Paulsen claims that this is the original linguistic meaning of the
First Amendment, but he does not cite, and I am not aware of, any contemporaneous writer 
who reads it as he does. At the time, the amendment was not understood to mandate any
judicial accommodations. See Phillip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious
Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915, 931 (1992). Instead, 
Paulsen imagines a small menu of possible regimes—which excludes the one we actually 
have, see ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY 166–67 
412
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Paulsen understands—what Smith never acknowledges—that this will 
put the state in an embarrassing position when, say, Abraham thinks that 
God has commanded him to sacrifice his son Isaac.116  So Paulsen adds a 
proviso: deference “must give way in clear, or extreme, cases—because
surely there are some claims individuals make about God’s commands 
that are simply intolerably and irredeemably false.”117 This is not because
the state’s commands are superior to God’s. God forbid. “There are some
things that we can and should confidently say God thinks are always and
everywhere wrong (or at least we should so presume).”118  In such a case, 
“there is no true command of God to be obeyed.”119 
He knows he has entered the valley of the shadow of death. “Past a certain 
point, quickly reached, the business of judging the truth or validity of religious 
beliefs destroys religious liberty.”120 This business also has other discomforts. 
Paulsen cannot bring himself to say that Abraham was wrong, and he thinks
that the refusal of medical care to children by Christian Scientists and Jehovah’s 
Witnesses presents “extraordinarily difficult problems.”121 
The logic of religious liberty, Paulsen thinks, makes inevitable a state
role as the arbiter of religious truth.122  He thus places himself athwart a long
tradition that has held that allowing the state to do that inevitably corrupts 
religion. In the Memorial and Remonstrance, Madison argued that the idea
“that the Civil Magistrate is a competent Judge of Religious truth . . . . is 
(2013)—and picks from these the one he finds most consistent with religious accommodation,
and works out its logical implications.
116. See Paulsen, supra note 103, at 1206. 
117.  Id. at 1160–61. 
118. Id. at 1214. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. at 1212. 
121. Id. at 1208 n.144. Kathleen Brady, whose arguments have a similar structure 
to Paulsen’s, proposes that “religious believers should be afforded relief whenever laws
substantially burden practices essential to their relationship with the divine unless there is
no way to alleviate the burden without endangering the existence, peace, or safety of the
state, or basic conditions of public order, or invading the rights of others.” KATHLEEN
A. BRADY, THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF RELIGION IN AMERICAN LAW: RETHINKING RELIGION 
CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 304 (2015). She does not explain how God’s commands could
be overridden by such mundane matters as the state’s peace and safety, public order,
or rights. For further critique of Brady, see generally my review, Andrew Koppelman, Kathleen
Brady, The Distinctiveness of Religion in American Law: Rethinking Religion Clause
Jurisprudence, 97 J. RELIGION 548 (2017). 
122. See Paulsen, supra note 103, at 1167–68. 
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an arrogant pretension falsified by the contradictory opinions of Rulers in
all ages.”123 
Smith is troubled by the requirement that laws have a secular purpose.  
He thinks it shows the triumph of paganism in the Supreme Court.124  This
reading of the history is hard to reconcile with the reasons the Court 
actually gave, that “religion is too personal, too sacred, too holy, to permit 
its ‘unhallowed perversion’ by a civil magistrate.”125 It also neglects the
role of Jews in the Warren Court’s embrace of strong separation. Once 
more, you need to talk to the natives. The law of disestablishment is based
on reverence, not contempt, for religion.
Madison’s rhetorical move made sense within a Lockean framework, 
where religious and secular duties operated in different spheres, so that conflict 
could easily be avoided.126  Locke had no use for exemptions from generally
applicable laws: if the state is doing its legitimate business, religious objections 
could have no weight. If religious exemptions are to be justified, it must
be on some basis other than Madison’s suggestion that religious duties 
categorically override secular ones. The effort to build a theory of religious 
liberty on that suggestion is a dead end.
Religion is an appropriate category of protection because it refers to 
interests, not otherwise signifiable, urgent enough to be a basis of rights.  
Perhaps this cluster concept does not correspond to any real category of morally 
salient thought or conduct. It is flexible enough to capture intuitions about
accommodation while keeping the state neutral about theological questions.127 
The case for exemptions will have to be based on personal interests that
are commensurable with other interests that may defeat them. Otherwise,
there is no good answer to Abraham.
Balancing religious liberty against other goods is not a manifestation of 
incipient paganism.  It is a manifestation of sanity.
123. Madison, supra note 101, at 61. 
124. See SMITH, supra note 1, at 274. 
125. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431–32 (1962) (quoting Madison, supra note 101, at
61).  This concern, theistic all the way down, has pervasively shaped the law of the religion 
clauses.  See Andrew Koppelman, Corruption of Religion and the Establishment Clause, 
50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1831 (2009); Andrew Koppelman, Justice Stevens, Religious 
Enthusiast, 106 NW. U.L. REV. 567 (2012).
126. See Madison, supra note 101, at 62. 
127. I have expanded on this point in Andrew Koppelman, How Could Religious 
Liberty be a Human Right?, 16 INT’L J. CONST. L. 985 (2018); Andrew Koppelman, 
Nonexistent & Irreplaceable: Keep the Religion in Religious Freedom, COMMONWEAL, 
Apr. 10, 2015; Andrew Koppelman, Religion’s Specialized Specialness, 79 U. CHI.L. REV.
DIALOGUE 71 (2017) (responding to Micah Schwartzman, What if Religion Is Not Special, 79 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1351 (2012)); Andrew Koppelman, “Religion” as a Bundle of Legal Proxies:
Reply to Micah Schwartzman, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1079 (2014). For a similar argument,
see Christopher C. Lund, Religion is Special Enough, 103 VA. L. REV. 481 (2017). 
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VI. POSSIBILITIES FOR COEXISTENCE
So what about Rawls’s question: “How is it possible that there may exist
over time a stable and just society of free and equal citizens profoundly 
divided by reasonable though incompatible religious, philosophical, and 
moral doctrines?”128  Smith thinks that his pessimistic diagnosis of Rome 
applies as well to the contemporary United States.129  So long as so many
Americans are closed to transcendence, persecution is inevitable. Our only
hope is that the pagans experience a religious conversion—and this time 
without a Christian emperor to force them. The book’s conclusion appears 
to be an appeal for such a conversion.
Smith’s grand narrative is an example of what Charles Taylor calls 
“subtraction stories,” which hold that, if theistic religion is abandoned, 
what emerges “is to be understood in terms of underlying features of 
human nature which were there all along, but had been impeded by what 
is now set aside.”130 
Smith’s subtraction story is this: if one eliminates theism, what remains
is a paganism that unites ancient Rome and modern New York. For the
Romans, “sexual gratification was something to be celebrated and assiduously
pursued,”131 and the same is true of the moderns.  The Romans persecuted
Christians, so the New Yorkers must at least be headed in that direction.
What modern secularists are in fact guilty of is that they remind Smith of 
the Romans. It is like attacking vegetarianism because Hitler was a vegetarian. 
Both Smith and the militant atheists are confident of what people will
believe if you take theism away.  Both are wrong. Atheism per se has no
normative entailments whatsoever. It is consistent with profound humanitarian 
concern or sociopathic evil.132 
One reason Taylor rejects such stories is that contemporary atheism has 
no good account of its own commitment to universal benevolence, which
it cannot disentangle fully from its roots in Christian agape.133 
128. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
129. See SMITH, supra note 1, at 259–60.
130. CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE 22 (2007).
131. SMITH, supra note 1, at 283. 
132. Smith has denied in conversation that he is embracing a subtraction story.  But 
without one, how can paganism be an entity with distinctive characteristics? How could 
it entail, for example, the intolerance that so concerns him? 
133. TAYLOR supra note 130, at 245–59. 
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That I am left with only human concerns doesn’t tell me to take universal human
welfare as my goal; nor does it tell me that freedom is important, or fulfillment, 
or equality.  Just being confined to human goods could just as well find expression in
my concerning myself exclusively with my own material welfare, or that of my
family and immediate milieu. The in fact very exigent demands of universal
justice and benevolence which characterize modern humanism can’t be explained just
by the subtraction of earlier goals and allegiances.134 
Smith makes the same point. He claims that “an interest-satisfying or
preference-fulfilling consequentialism does seem to be the normative posture 
most congruent with the disenchanted world of philosophical naturalism.”135 
Desires and preferences are natural facts, and the question of what will 
best fulfill them is susceptible to empirical investigation. That, he thinks,
is why philosophical naturalists are drawn to this account of ethics. But
there is a puzzle: if the good is merely desire satisfaction, “why should
anyone ever care about the good of others, except in a self-serving, quid 
pro quo way?”136 
Smith’s aim here is to show the incoherence of secular liberalism.  He
wants to show that a transcendent perspective is more intellectually and 
morally satisfying.137 If the aim is to help reduce the intensity of today’s
culture wars, however, a different inference can be drawn. 
Utilitarianism aims to gratify whatever preferences people actually 
have, leaving them free to pursue whatever ends they find attractive.  For 
any person to take general utility as an end, however, is an extraordinarily
demanding task, requiring that I give as much weight to the happiness of
others as I do to my own. If I am to pursue a utilitarian policy, I may have 
to endure the frustration of my own preferences. Smith is right that
utilitarianism cannot explain why I should do that. But then, an immanent, 
pagan orientation does not entail utilitarianism. As Taylor also emphasizes, 
utilitarianism assumes, without explaining, an intense and demanding
benevolence.138 So do the more sophisticated forms of secular political 
philosophy that have displaced it, such as Rawlsian contractarianism.  Smith 
is right that this ideal, which is baked into contemporary secularism, has 
Christian roots. 
But that means the opposition that motivates today’s culture wars is far
less profound than the division between Roman pagans and Christians.  One
can easily imagine what the Romans would have thought of the utilitarian 
134. Id. at 572. 
135. SMITH, supra note 1, at 225. 
136.  Id. at 226. 
137. He develops this claim at greater length in id. at 344–79. 
138.  See CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN 
ENTITYID  31 (8th prtg. 2006). 
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notion that the happiness of a Roman Senator matters no more than that of a
slave.
Modern secular economics and public administration, relying as they do
on utilitarian premises, incorporates precisely this demanding benevolence. 
And so does a lot of secularist political discourse. It can, as Smith observes, 
protect religion only on the basis of the intense feelings of its adherents, 
without giving any obeisance to the worthiness of its objects.139  But if the
protection happens, why should anyone care? 
Smith cites the Memories Pizza incident as evidence that “modern 
paganism . . . is severely censorious not just of antisocial actions but also
of what it perceives as racist or sexist or homophobic attitudes or expressions. 
Remember Memories Pizza.”140 The episode was not pretty. At one point
during the controversy over Indiana’s RFRA, a TV reporter walked into a
pizzeria to ask the owners what they thought of the religious accommodation 
issue, and they naively indicated that they would not cater a gay wedding.141 
It was a silly question—weddings are rarely catered with pizza—and they
should have refused to talk to him. They were then subjected to a flood
of vituperation and one threat of arson, which led them to temporarily close 
the business and consider leaving the state.142 Before one analogizes this
to the Roman persecution of the Christians, though, notice that none of what
139. See SMITH, supra note 1, at 328–33. 
140. Id. at 360 (citing David McCabe, Indiana’s Memories Pizza Reopens After Gay 
Rights Furor, HILL (Apr. 10, 2015, 9:18 AM), https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-
room/news/238415-indiana-pizza-parlor-embroiled-in-religious-freedom-law-reopens [https:// 
perma.cc/Y324-UQMJ]).
141. RFRA: Michiana Business Wouldn’t Cater a Gay Wedding, ABC57 (Apr. 1, 
2015, 9:37 AM), http://www.abc57.com/news/rfra-first-business-to-publicly-deny-same-
sex-service [https://perma.cc/QPQ3-9YNR].
142. Conor Friedersdorf, Should Mom-and-Pops That Forgo Gay Weddings Be
Destroyed?, ATLANTIC (Apr. 3, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/
should-businesses-that-quietly-oppose-gay-marriage-be-destroyed/389489 [https://perma.cc/
NT6P-ZRMD]. The pizzeria eventually reopened, and some months later a gay couple took 
great satisfaction in buying two pizzas there and serving it at their wedding ceremony. Billy
Hallowell, Gay Couple Ordered Two Large Pies From Memories Pizza. What They Did Next
Is Getting a Lot of Attention, BLAZE (Sept. 29, 2015), http://www.theblaze.com/news/2015/
09/29/memories-pizza-said-it-wouldnt-cater-same-sex-weddings-but-this-gay-couple-
claims-they-tricked-the-shop-into-doing-just-that/ [https://perma.cc/5KGX-K27H]. The 
pizzeria owner was untroubled when he learned the truth about the order: “‘We weren’t
catering to their wedding,’ he said. ‘They were picking pizzas up.’” Billy Hallowell, Christian 
Owner of Memories Pizza Responds to Claim that His Shop ‘Catered’ a Gay Wedding, 
BLAZE (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.theblaze.com/news/2015/10/01/memories-pizza-owner-
responds-to-claim-that-his-shop-catered-a-gay-wedding/ [https://perma.cc/T43E-2RLZ]. 
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the pizzeria endured came from the state. The worst threat came from a high 
school softball coach who tweeted, “Who’s going to Walkerton, IN to burn 
down #memoriespizza with me?”143 The tweet triggered a police investigation, 
and she was fired from her job.144 Christians get the same protection from
violence as everyone else. The protection of unpopular opinions is part of
today’s Rawlsian overlapping consensus. “Remember Memories Pizza,”145 
indeed. 
For practical purposes, there is quite a lot of agreement between conservative 
Christians and modern secularists. Secular liberalism and conservative 
Christianity alike condemn lying, cruelty, poverty, oppression, and prejudice.
They need to unite against their common enemies. 
The way to begin to cope with religious diversity is to talk to the natives.
When we do that, we may discover more common ground than we expected. 
We may even discover important aspects of our own views we had not 
noticed.146 It is not helpful to diagnose current disagreements in a way that
makes those disagreements seem more profound than they actually are. 
143. Concord Fires Assistant Softball Coach over Memories Pizza Tweet, S. BEND 
TRIB. (Apr. 22, 2015), https://www.southbendtribune.com/news/business/concord-fires-
assistant-softball-coach-over-memories-pizza-tweet/article_63d2f14c-e849-11e4-83c7-5 
bb86f8f4576.html [https://perma.cc/YG67-9CVT]; Katherine Timpf, High School Coach:
Anyone Want to Help Me ‘Burn Down’ the Pizzeria that Won’t Cater Gay Weddings?, 




145. SMITH, supra note 1, at 360. 
146. See generally Andrew Koppelman, If Liberals Knew Themselves Better, Conservatives
Might Like Them Better, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1201 (2017). 
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